Corporate Constituents: Corporations Have More Influence on the Federal Government than Real People Under Current U.S. Campaign Finance Regulations by Schoell, Colin
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 
Volume 47 
Number 1 Fall 2019 Article 8 
Fall 2019 
Corporate Constituents: Corporations Have More Influence on the 
Federal Government than Real People Under Current U.S. 
Campaign Finance Regulations 
Colin Schoell 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Colin Schoell, Corporate Constituents: Corporations Have More Influence on the Federal Government than 
Real People Under Current U.S. Campaign Finance Regulations, 47 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165 (2019). 
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol47/iss1/8 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu. 
(DO NOT DELETE) 10/7/2019 11:44 AM 
 
[165] 
Corporate Constituents:  
Corporations Have More Influence on the 
Federal Government than Real People Under 
Current U.S. Campaign Finance Regulations 
by COLIN SCHOELL* 
Introduction 
In the 2016 United States presidential election, just 55.7% of voting-
age citizens in the United States went to the polls and cast ballots.1  This 
percentage ranks 26th among developed countries, behind countries such as 
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Estonia.2  One of the main reasons that 
Americans do not vote is because they feel the system is corrupt, and their 
voices do not have an impact.3  This feeling that the system is corrupt likely 
stems from the massive amount of outside money spent every two years on 
campaigns, especially by super political actions committees (“PACs”) that 
are often funded by corporations.4  This feeling that the political system is 
corrupt led to President Donald Trump’s wildly popular promise to “Drain 
the Swamp.”5  However, not only has he failed to fulfill that promise, but he 
 
 *  J.D. Candidate 2020, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.S. 
Environmental Studies, University of California, Santa Barbara, 2017. 
 1.  Drew Desilver, U.S. Trails Most Developed Countries In Voter Turnout, Pew Research 
Center (May 21, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/05/21/u-s-voter-turnout-trails-
most-developed-countries/.  
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Asma Khalid, Don Gonyea & Leila Fadel, On The Sidelines of Democracy: Exploring 
Why So Many Americans Don’t Vote, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 10, 2018, 5:07 AM), https://www. 
npr.org/2018/09/10/645223716/on-the-sidelines-of-democracy-exploring-why-so-many-american 
s-dont-vote. 
 4.  Outside Spending, OPEN SECRETS https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending 
/index.php?type=Y&filter=S (last visited Sept. 13, 2019). 
 5.  Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 18, 2016, 8:33 AM), https://twitter. 
com/realdonaldtrump/status/788402585816276992. 
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has exacerbated the problem in the eyes of many.6  For that reason, campaign 
finance reform has become increasingly popular among Americans – 
Democratic leaders, including the Speaker of the House of Represenatives, 
Nancy Pelosi, have taken initiative by means of legislative vote in the House 
of Representatives, towards reducing the influence of political money.7 
This Note will analyze the changes in campaign finance regulations, 
the reasons for those changes, and potential future changes in campaign 
finance regulation.  Part I of this Note will review the history of campaign 
financing in the United States, from the earliest federal elections up to the 
most recent.  There have been several major shifts in how campaigns are 
financed over the course of the United States’s 242-year history, evolving 
as the country grew from an estimated 2.5 million residents to nearly 330 
million today.8  Part I will accomplish this review by examining three major 
pieces of congressional legislation that precipitated major shifts in 
campaign finance regulation: the Tillman Act of 1907, the Federal Election 
Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”), and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act of 2002 (“BCRA”). 
Part II will examine the four main United States Supreme Court cases 
that interpreted FECA and BCRA, and that currently govern federal 
campaign spending.  These cases are Buckley v. Valeo, McConnell v. Federal 
Election Commission, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, and 
McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission.99  These cases show a trend 
toward deregulation of campaign financing, and have created a system with 
essentially no limits on the amount of money a person or corporation may 
spend to influence political candidates. 
Part III will examine the current state of federal campaign financing, 
including the impact that the large amount of money needed for a 
congressional campaign has on Congress’ effectiveness, and public 
perception of political corruption.  These effects and perceptions will be 
compared to the rationales set forth by the Justices of the United States 
Supreme Court in the four main opinions on campaign finance, to determine 
whether those arguments still hold true or have been subverted by the current 
 
 6.  Helaine Olen, Trump Didn’t Drain the Swamp. Supporters are Starting to Notice., WASH. 
POST (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2018/09/11/trum 
p-didnt-drain-the-swamp-supporters-are-starting-to-notice/. 
 7.  Peter Overby, Democrats Say Their First Bill Will Focus On Strengthening Democracy 
at Home, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 12, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/11/12/6656358 
32/democrats-say-their-first-bill-will-focus-on-strengthening-democracy-at-home. 
 8.  Derick Moore, Fun Facts: From Counties Named Liberty to $368.6M Worth of Fireworks 
Sold, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU (July 2, 2019), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/ 
2019/07/july-fourth-celebrating-243-years-of-independence.html. 
 9.  Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); McConnell, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); Citizens United, 558 U.S. 
310 (2010); McCutcheon, 572 U.S. 185 (2014). 
(DO NOT DELETE) 10/7/2019  11:44 AM 
FALL 2019] CORPORATE CONSTITUENTS 167 
system of campaign finance.  I find that while the arguments, taken 
individually, make sense or could work in a perfect world, the combination 
of these opinions, as applied in the real world, has created a system rife with 
corruption or the appearance of corruption that Congress tried to prevent by 
regulating campaign financing.  This corruption is protected by the Supreme 
Court decisions under the guise of protecting freedom of speech under the 
First Amendment.  This Note will also analyze the fundraising strategies 
used in recent elections because, while campaign finance laws apply to all 
candidates equally, the two major American political parties have utilized 
different strategies in order to raise the highest amount of money without 
losing voter support. 
Finally, Part IV will argue for several ways in which meaningful 
campaign finance reform could be accomplished to reduce voter 
disillusionment, and the appearance of corruption through campaign 
donations.  These potential options include: a new Supreme Court ruling, the 
passage of legislation by Congress, or finally, a new constitutional 
amendment.  This section will provide examples and analyze the benefits 
and consequences of each option, along with the likelihood that each option 
will occur. 
I.  History of U.S. Campaign Financing Legislation 
Just as he was a Founding Father of the United States, President George 
Washington was the “father of campaign finance reform.”10  After losing his 
first election to the Virginia House of Burgesses in 1755, Washington threw 
a lavish feast to persuade the electorate to vote for him.11  This prompted the 
first campaign finance law in one of the colonies of the future United States 
of America, which prohibited candidates from giving away “money, meat, 
drink, entertainment or provision or . . . any present, gift, reward or 
entertainment etc. in order to be elected.”12  The first law passed by Congress 
that addressed this issue was the Naval Appropriations Bill of 1867, which 
prohibited soliciting naval yard workers for money.13  The second law that 
addressed the issue was the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act in 1883, 
which prohibited government officials from soliciting civil service workers 
 
 10.  Jim Toedtman, Campaign Cash Degrades Discussion of Issues, AMERICAN ASS’N OF 
RETIRED PERSONS (Apr. 10, 2012), https://www.aarp.org/politics-society/government-elections/ 
info-04-2012/campaign-cash-key-issues.html. 
 11.  Jaime Fuller, From George Washington to Shaun McCutcheon: A Brief-ish History of 
Campaign Finance Reform., WASHI. POST (Apr. 3, 2014, 9:15 AM), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/04/03/a-history-of-campaign-finance-reform-from-george-washington 
-to-shaun-mccutcheon/. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
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for contributions in exchange for retaining their positions.14  These simplistic 
restrictions were just the beginning of attempts to limit the amount of money 
used in an effort to swing an election in favor of a specific candidate. 
A. The Tillman Act of 1907 and the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 
During his campaign for the 1904 United States presidential election, 
Theodore Roosevelt accepted more than $2 million from the corporations of 
wealthy capitalists, which helped him win the presidency by a large margin.15  
President Roosevelt then called on Congress to enact “vigorous measures to 
eradicate” perceived political corruption created by political contributions 
from corporations.16  Congress listened to Roosevelt and passed the Tillman 
Act of 1907, which prohibited corporations from making monetary 
donations to national political campaigns.17  In 1943, Congress passed the 
Smith-Connelly Act and extended this prohibition on campaign donations to 
labor unions, which had begun using their dues for political donations.18 
While these laws prohibited corporations and labor unions from 
donating directly to political campaigns, they could still make their own 
expenditures in support of or in opposition to any candidate through 
“PACs”.19  Congress closed this loophole by passing the Taft-Hartley Act of 
1947, and prohibited corporations and labor unions from making 
independent expenditures in all federal political campaigns.20  The labor 
unions instead used the first PAC, the Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(“CIO”), as a workaround.21  This was a legitimate legal strategy because the 
CIO, rather than the unions, donated or made expenditures to federal 
political campaigns.22 
These laws were not very effective, however, because Congress failed 
to implement an effective method of enforcement.  The first federal 
campaign financial disclosure laws were passed in 1910 in the House of 
Representatives, and in 1911 in the Senate, three and four years after the 
 
 14.  Fuller, supra note 11. 
 15.  Sidney Milkis, Theodore Roosevelt: Campaigns and Elections, UVA MILLER CENTER 
OF PUB.AFFAIRS, https://millercenter.org/president/roosevelt/campaigns-and-elections (last visited 
July 23, 2019). 
 16.  Fuller, supra note 11. 
 17.  Tillman Act, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (1907).   
 18.  Fuller, supra note 11. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
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passage of the Tillman Act, respectively.23  Candidates easily evaded these 
laws however, as there was no penalty for a candidate who claimed to have 
no knowledge of spending on his behalf.24  The sheer amount of campaign 
donations and expenditures that went unreported is demonstrated by the fact 
that political candidates in the 1968 congressional campaigns reported $8.5 
million in campaign contributions, while candidates in the 1972 
congressional campaigns, following the passage of FECA, reported $88.9 
million in campaign contributions.25  Prior to 1972, candidates simply would 
not report any contributions that exceeded the limits that were in place, and, 
if caught, claimed to have no knowledge of the excess spending.26 
B. Federal Election Campaign Act and the Federal Election 
Commission 
In an effort to more effectively regulate the amount of money donated 
and spent on federal political campaigns, Congress enacted FECA in 1971.27  
This legislation required full reporting of all campaign contributions and 
expenditures.28  Additionally, the law laid the groundwork for the first 
official labor union PACs and corporate PACs, even though the CIO had 
been around for several decades at this point.29  Along with FECA, Congress 
passed the United States Revenue Act of 1971 (“Revenue Act”), which 
allowed citizens to check a box on their tax form to give one of their tax 
dollars to finance United States presidential campaigns during the general 
election.30  As a condition for the public financing, once a presidential 
candidate accepted public campaign donations, they could no longer accept 
private contributions.31 
Under the Revenue Act, the Clerk of the United States House of 
Representatives (“Clerk”), the Secretary of the Senate (“Secretary”), and the 
Comptroller General of the United States General Accounting Officer 
(“Comptroller General”) were responsible for monitoring compliance with 
disclosure requirements, and for reporting violations to the United States 
 
 23.  The Federal Election Campaign Laws: A Short History, FEDERAL ELECTION 
COMMISSION, https://transition.fec.gov/info/appfour.htm (last visited July 23, 2019) [hereinafter 
FEC History]. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972). 
 28.  FEC History, supra note 23. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id.  
 31.  Public Funding of Presidential Campaigns Brochure, FED. ELEC. COMM’N, https:// 
transition.fec.gov/pages/brochures/pubfund.shtml#anchor688095 (last visited July 23, 2019). 
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Department of Justice (“Justice Department”) for prosecution.32  This system 
of oversight was extremely ineffective, and although the Clerk, Secretary, 
and Comptroller General reported approximately 7,100 violations to the 
Justice Department, very few violations were actually prosecuted.33  These 
continued violations of campaign finance regulations led Congress to amend 
FECA in 1974.34 
Congress passed comprehensive amendments to FECA in 1974 
hoping to limit the amount of money spent on elections, and to eliminate 
violations by establishing an independent regulation agency, the Federal 
Election Commission (“FEC”).35  The FEC took over campaign finance 
oversight from the Clerk, Secretary, and Comptroller General.36  Under 
these amendments, the President, the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, and the president pro tempore of the Senate each appoint 
two commissioners to comprise the six voting members of the FEC.37  The 
final two members of the eight–member commission are appointed by the 
Secretary and the Clerk as ex officio (nonvoting) members.38  Congress 
gave the FEC recordkeeping, disclosure, and investigatory functions, as 
well as extensive rulemaking, adjudicatory, and enforcement powers over 
federal campaign financing regulations.39 
In order to regulate the amount of money spent on federal political 
campaigns, Congress used these amendments to establish limits on the 
contributions and expenditures a person or group could make to one 
candidate, and in the aggregate.40  FECA limited individual contributions to 
$1,000 for any single candidate per election, and $25,000 overall per 
election.41  Additionally, FECA limited campaign expenditures by 
individuals and groups “relative to a clearly identified candidate” to $1,000 
per year, and limited campaign spending per candidate using prescribed 
limits.42  Just two years after Congress enacted these limits, however, they 
were challenged in Buckley v. Valeo, which is discussed below.43 
 
 32.  FEC History, supra note 23. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Fed. Elec. Campaign Act Amends. of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974).  
 35.  FEC History, supra note 23. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 113.  
 39.  Id. at 110. 
 40.  Id. at 7. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. 
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C. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”) 
All of the legislation leading up to and including FECA focused on the 
regulation of “hard money,” which is donated directly to a political campaign 
or spent advocating for a specific candidate’s election or defeat.44  This 
legislation did nothing to regulate the amount of “soft money,” which is 
donated to political parties, or “party-building” activities, such as “get-out-
the-vote” drives, voter registration efforts, and generic political party 
advertisements.45  An unlimited amount of soft money could be donated to 
candidates, and the amount of soft money raised by both parties skyrocketed 
from $105.1 million in 1993-1994 to $487.4 million in 1999-2000.46 
In response to this influx of unregulated money into political parties, 
Congress passed the BCRA, also known as the McCain-Feingold Act.47  This 
legislation sought to address “the increased importance of ‘soft money’, 
[and] the proliferation of ‘issue ads,’” which focus on a policy issue, rather 
than on electing or defeating a candidate.48  To address these issues, 
Congress regulated the use of soft money by political parties and candidates, 
and prohibited corporations and unions from using general treasury funds to 
influence federal election outcomes.49  These regulations were challenged 
the very next year in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, which is 
discussed below.50 
II.  United States Supreme Court Decisions on 
 Constitutionality of Campaign Financing 
The United States Supreme Court did not enter the arena of campaign 
finance regulation until 1976, choosing to defer to Congress’ knowledge and 
understanding of the corrupting power of money in politics.  However, the 
passage of FECA led to constitutional challenges that eventually reached the 
Supreme Court.51  The United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Colombia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals “) viewed FECA as “by 
far the most comprehensive reform legislation (ever) passed by Congress” 
concerning federal elections, and upheld all but one provision, which they 
 
 44.  Bill Mears, Where the Money Is: A Campaign Spending Primer, CNN (Jan. 23, 2012, 
7:19 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2012/01/23/politics/campaign-spending-primer/index.html. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  STEFFEN SCHMIDT, MACK SHELLEY & BARBARA BARDES, AM. GOV’T AND POLITICS 
TODAY 360 (Carolyn Merrill et al. eds., 14th ed. 2008). 
 47.  Fuller, supra note 11. 
 48.  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 93.  
 49.  Id. at 94. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7. 
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considered to be too vague or overbroad.52  Since then, several subsequent 
Supreme Court decisions have chipped away at campaign finance on 
constitutional grounds. 
A. Buckley v. Valeo (1978) 
In order to challenge the contribution and expenditure limits established 
by FECA, a group of plaintiffs, including a presidential candidate, a senator 
seeking reelection, and a potential contributor, filed suit claiming that the 
limits unconstitutionally interfered with their freedoms of speech and 
association, which are protected by the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.53  The Court found some merit in their arguments, specifically 
the idea that political expenditures qualified as speech, rather than conduct, 
and therefore limiting political expenditures infringed on the First 
Amendment’s protection of freedom of speech.54  The Court upheld FECA’s 
individual contribution limits, the establishment of the FEC, disclosure and 
reporting requirements, and public financing scheme for presidential 
elections as constitutional under the First Amendment.55  However, the Court 
struck down limits on campaign expenditures, both per candidate limits and 
aggregate limits on independent expenditures by individuals and groups, and 
limits on personal expenditures by candidates because they violated the 
freedom of speech and freedom of association.56 
While the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals found the restrictions of 
monetary expenditures to be symbolic conduct that could be regulated as 
such, the Supreme Court determined that some communications made by 
spending money “involve speech alone, some involve conduct primarily, and 
some involve a combination of the two.”57  The Court found that, even if the 
expenditure of money is considered to be conduct, the limits would still be 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment because the government’s 
interest in “equalizing the relative ability of all voters to affect electoral 
outcomes” through individual expenditure limits suppresses 
communication.58  Although the regulation of independent political 
expenditures was not content based, the Court found that the government 
does have an interest in regulating the conduct of spending because the 
communication integral to the conduct was harmful.59 
 
 52.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 831 (1975)). 
 53.  Id. at 14. 
 54.  Id. at 16. 
 55.  Id. at 143. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. at 16. 
 58.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 17. 
 59.  U.S. v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968). 
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In its analysis, the Court differentiated between the limits on individual 
expenditures and the limits on contributions by the severity of each limit’s 
restriction on First Amendment rights of those spending the money.60  While 
limits on expenditures explicitly capped the amount of political speech a 
person could disseminate using their money, a limit on donating to a 
candidate “entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability 
to engage in free communication.”61  This is because donating money to a 
candidate communicates personal support for that candidate, but the quantity 
of communication of that support “does not increase perceptibly with the 
size of his contribution.”62  The communication rests solely on the “symbolic 
act of contributing.”63 
This distinction between contributions and expenditures seems rather 
arbitrary, as independently spending money in support of a candidate could 
be viewed as a similarly symbolic act to contributing money to that 
candidate.  The same could be said of the reverse of the Court’s reasoning: 
limiting the amount of money an individual may contribute to a candidate 
effectively limits the amount of speech in support of that candidate their 
money can be used for.  The Court explains this discrepancy by emphasizing 
that, for a contribution to become political expression, it must involve 
someone other than the contributor.64  Additionally, the Court describes the 
contribution limit as a restriction on “one aspect of the contributor’s freedom 
of political association,” while individual expenditure limits are regulations 
that primarily and substantially infringe on the freedom of speech.65 
In addition to the difference in which First Amendment protection is 
infringed upon by the limits on individual expenditures or contributions, the 
government interest in regulating the amount of money an individual may 
contribute to a candidate is much stronger.  The main argument, which the 
Court finds “unnecessary to look beyond” to find a constitutionally sufficient 
justification for the contribution limit, is the “prevention of corruption and 
the appearance of corruption spawned by the real or imagined coercive 
influence of large financial contributions on candidates’ positions.”66  This 
government interest is not present in the regulation of individual 
 
 60.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. at 21. 
 63.  Id. (By contributing to a candidate, a person associates themselves with that candidate 
but cannot become more associated with the candidate by contributing more.  In contrast, a person 
can always produce more speech for a candidate by making more independent expenditures for that 
candidate.). 
 64.  Id. at 21. 
 65.  Id. at 24-25. 
 66.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25. 
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expenditures, because contributions lend themselves much more readily 
to a political quid pro quo with current or future office holders.67  The 
Court emphasizes the importance of eliminating actual quid pro quo 
arrangements or even the appearance of corruption in the political system, 
because otherwise “the integrity of our system of representative 
democracy is undermined.”68 
Because the government’s interest in preventing corruption or the 
appearance of corruption in politics was sufficient to sustain the individual 
contribution limits, the Court did not analyze the two secondary 
governmental interests at play.69  However, those interests are worth 
mentioning here.  First, the limits serve to quiet the voices of the wealthy, 
and hence, to equalize the relative ability of all citizens to affect electoral 
outcomes.70  Second, the contribution limits serve as a deterrent on the 
skyrocketing cost of political campaigns, and gives candidates without 
access to large sums of money the ability to run for office on a level playing 
field.  These interests are quite compelling, as the Court recognizes the 
“electorate’s increasing dependence on . . . mass media for news and 
information,” as well as the effectiveness of those mediums.71  
Unfortunately, the Court failed to recognize the distorting effect that the 
wealthy who flood those mediums with their message, and effectively shut 
out all other messages.  The government has a compelling interest in 
preventing this distortion, because it silences the messages of the less 
wealthy, counteracting the reasons for upholding individual campaign 
expenditure limits. 
Justice White dissented in part from the Opinion of the Court, arguing 
that individual expenditure limits violate the First Amendment.72  He 
emphasized the fact that “Congress has the power under the Constitution 
to regulate the election of federal officers,” and to protect the election from 
corruption.73  Because this power is clear under the Constitution, “the 
choice of means to that end presents a question primarily addressed to the 
judgment of Congress.”74  Congress concluded that limits on both 
contributions and expenditures were “essential if the aims of the act were 
to be achieved fully.”75 
 
 67.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26. 
 68.  Id. at 26-27. 
 69.  Id. at 26. 
 70.  Id. at 25-26. 
 71.  Id. at 19. 
 72.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 259 (White, J., dissenting in part). 
 73.  Id. at 257-58. 
 74.  Burroughs v. U.S., 290 U.S. 534, 547 (1934). 
 75.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 258 (White, J., dissenting in part). 
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Justice White accurately identifies that because both limits are content 
neutral, the case depends on “whether the nonspeech interests of the Federal 
Government in regulating the use of money in political campaigns are 
sufficiently urgent to justify the incidental effects that the limitations” have 
on First Amendment rights.76  He also correctly points to the glaring 
inconsistency in the Court’s decision to uphold the limits on individual 
contributions while striking down the limits on individual expenditures, 
because “Congress was plainly of the view that these expenditures also have 
corruptive potential.”77 
Finally, “the argument that money is speech and that limiting the flow 
of money to the speaker violates the First Amendment proves entirely too 
much.”78  Federal and state taxes take money out of citizens’ pockets and 
company treasuries, but are not unconstitutional for siphoning away “large 
sums that would otherwise be available for communicative activities.”79  
And under the Court’s decision here, if two people purchased $1 million in 
television advertisements in support of a candidate, but one first acquired the 
approval of the candidate, only that person would be in violation of the law.80  
These inconsistencies show the illogical nature of the Court’s decision to 
uphold individual contribution limits while striking down individual 
expenditure limits. 
Buckley v. Valeo dealt solely with “hard money” contributions, 
expenditures, and disclosure requirements, and following the decision, both 
political parties began looking for ways to work around the upheld 
contribution limits.  This work around was found in the use of “soft money,” 
as discussed earlier.81  The passage of BCRA led to the second major United 
States Supreme Court case regarding campaign finance reform laws. 
B. McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003) 
BCRA sought to limit “soft money” contributions as well as financing 
from labor union and corporation general funds, but the constitutionality of 
those regulations was promptly challenged and decided by the Supreme 
Court in 2003.82  Following reasoning similar to Buckley, the Court upheld 
the restrictions on soft money contributions to political parties due to the 
government’s interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of 
 
 76.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 260.  
 77.  Id. at 261. 
 78.  Id. at 262. 
 79.  Id. at 263. 
 80.  Id. at 261. 
 81.  Mears, supra note 44. 
 82.  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 93. 
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corruption.83  The restrictions imposed only a “marginal impact” on the 
ability to engage in political speech, and that impact was outweighed by the 
government’s interest in those restrictions.84 
The restriction on the expenditure of soft money by candidates on 
advertising, which explicitly advocated for the election or defeat of a 
political candidate, was similarly upheld.85  The Court found that the 
restriction was narrowly tailored to accomplish the goal of limiting 
corruption or the appearance of corruption in the political system because 
those donations have “the greatest potential to corrupt or give rise to the 
appearance of corruption of federal candidates.”86  General issue 
advertisements and advertisements which refer only to the candidate 
making the expenditure are exempted from this restriction because they 
are less effective and less likely to have a corrupting influence on 
candidates.87  For those reasons, the soft money expenditure restrictions 
survived First Amendment attack.88 
The plaintiffs in McConnell argued that Buckley distinguished between 
express advocacy for a candidate and general issue advocacy, and therefore 
speakers had “an inviolable First Amendment right to engage in the latter.”89  
This argument, the Court explained, misinterpreted Buckley since express 
advocacy restrictions were upheld as a matter of “statutory interpretation 
rather than constitutional command.”90  If Buckley had conferred an 
inviolable right to engage in general issue advocacy, this would have 
required a means of drawing a clear line between express advocacy and 
general issue advocacy.  This is difficult to do and would likely depend on 
whether the advertisement contained so-called “magic words” that expressly 
advocate for the election or defeat of a political candidate.  The Court has 
long recognized, however, that the “presence or absence of magic words 
cannot meaningfully distinguish electioneering speech from a true issue 
ad.”91  This decision therefore rendered Buckley’s magic-words requirement 
functionally meaningless.92 
Buckley established that corporations and labor unions cannot use 
general treasury funds to finance explicit advocacy in federal elections; 
 
 83.  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 142. 
 84.  Id. at 138. 
 85.  Id. at 188. 
 86.  Id. at 184. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. at 185. 
 89.  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 190. 
 90.  Id. at 192. 
 91.  Id. at 193 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45).  
 92.  Id. at 193. 
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however, BCRA extended this restriction to soft money contributions.93  The 
restrictions on soft money contributions only apply to general treasury funds, 
and still allow for the creation of PACs by corporations and labor unions to 
finance electioneering communications.94  Requiring soft money funds to be 
segregated in PACs helps eliminate the concern of using corporate funds to 
advance political causes or candidates at odds with the views of some 
shareholders or members.95  While the plaintiffs conceded that the 
Government has a compelling interest in regulating express advocacy 
advertisements, they argued that the segregated–fund requirement was 
overbroad.96  The plaintiffs claimed that, while the justifications of 
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption apply to express 
advocacy, they do not apply to “significant quantities of speech encompassed 
by the definition of electioneering communications.”97 
The Court dismissed this argument because “issue ads broadcast[ed] 
during the 30-day and 60-day periods preceding federal primary and general 
elections are the functional equivalent of express advocacy.”98  The 
justifications therefore apply as long as the advertisements aired in the two 
months leading up to the election are intended to influence voters’ decisions, 
and have that effect.99  If issue advocacy advertisements were not subject to 
the same segregated-fund requirement, then, in the future, corporations and 
labor unions would simply circumvent the express advocacy restriction 
upheld in Buckley and achieve the same effect by avoiding specific 
references to candidates in advertisements.100 
In Justice Scalia’s Dissenting Opinion, he argued that the expenditure 
of money on political campaigns is equivalent to speech, and therefore 
should not be abridged.101  Justice Scalia notes that there are three main 
arguments in favor of permitting the restriction of political money, but finds 
none of them convincing: (1) money is not speech, (2) pooling money is not 
speech, and (3) speech by corporations can be abridged.102  To support his 
argument, he references the origins of the concept of freedom of speech from 
 
 93.  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 203-04. 
 94.  Id. at 204. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. at 204-05. 
 97.  Id. at 206. 
 98.  Id.  
 99.  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. at 248 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part). 
 102.  Id. at 250-56. 
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the British Stamp Act of 1765, and the fact that the language of the First 
Amendment does not explicitly reference corporations.103 
Though Justice Scalia states that corporations were a familiar figure in 
American economic life at the time of the United States Bill of Rights, he 
failed to acknowledge that the sheer number of corporations in modern 
society has increased, and accordingly, their ability to influence politics, to 
the point where it is well beyond anything the Framers envisioned.104  At the 
end of the eighteenth century, American corporations did not have the money 
or technology to effectively drown out all other voices.  Additionally, 
comparing the expenditure or contribution of money to promote a political 
view to pure speech, such as printing a newspaper, implies that a person with 
more money is permitted to have more speech.  This flies in the face of the 
constitutional guarantee that all people, rich or poor, are equal.  Similarly, 
Justice Scalia’s assertion that pooling money in the form of political parties 
should be considered speech goes against his own originalist argument 
because the Founding Fathers did not want the country to become divided 
by political parties.  President George Washington urged as much in his 
farewell address, stressing “the danger of parties in the State.”105  While 
Justice Scalia’s arguments comprised the Dissenting Opinon in McConnell, 
they became the Majority Opinion just seven years later in Citizens United 
v. Federal Election Commission. 
C. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010) 
While Buckley and McConnell upheld FECA and BCRA prohibitions 
on corporations and labor unions using general treasury funds for political 
expenditures, the Court reversed these decisions in Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission.106  The Court’s primary reasoning behind 
reversing thirty-five years of precedent was that independent expenditures 
constitute speech and the government may not discriminate between 
speakers when regulating speech.107  This premise requires viewing 
corporations as entities which have an equal First Amendment right to free 
speech as do natural persons, a view that is contested in corporate law.  As 
Justice Stevens points out in his Dissenting Opinion, however, corporations 
“are not natural persons,” and though they contribute enormous amounts to 
society, they are not members of it.108 
 
 103.  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 250-56 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part). 
 104.  Id. at 256. 
 105.  See George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 19, 1796), in CLAYPOOLE’S AM. 
DAILY ADVERTISER. 
 106.  558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010). 
 107.  Id. at 341. 
 108.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 424 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
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The Court has long held that campaign finance restrictions are subject 
to strict scrutiny because they burden speech, so the restrictions must further 
a compelling interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.109  In 
past opinions, the Court found that the government has a compelling interest 
in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, along with an 
interest in preventing the distorting effects created by the expenditure of 
large sums of money by corporations on political advertising.110  In this case, 
the Court continued to acknowledge that the government has an interest in 
anti-distortion, anticorruption, and shareholder protection, but dismissed 
each as a justification for limiting independent expenditures by 
corporations.111  This is concerning because if those interests are not 
compelling enough to limit the vast amount of independent expenditures that 
corporations can make, it is difficult to imagine an interest that would be 
sufficiently compelling. 
The Court found that the interest in anti-distortion is outweighed by the 
censorship of “millions of associations of citizens,” preventing their voices 
and viewpoints from reaching the public.112  In making this argument, the 
Court failed to recognize that BCRA does nothing to censor those citizens 
from engaging in political speech themselves, and permits corporations to 
engage in political speech through PACs.  The Buckley Court found the 
interest of preventing quid pro quo corruption compelling, but in this case 
the Court found this argument unconvincing, as expenditures give “influence 
over or access to elected officials,” but do not necessarily mean those 
officials are corrupt.113  The Majority expressed confidence in the belief that 
the electorate will not “lose faith in our democracy” due to the appearance 
of corporate influence or access to elected officials.114  The Majority stated 
that “the people have the ultimate influence over elected officials,” ignoring 
the persuasive effect of corporations’ deep pocketbooks.115  Finally, the 
Court rejected the Government’s interest in protecting the views of 
shareholders with dissenting political views from the corporation simply 
because it would give the government the authority to restrict the 
corporation’s political speech.116 
 
 109.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340 (citing Fed. Elec. Comm’n v. Wis. Right To Life, 551 
U.S. 449, 464 (2007)). 
 110.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 348; McConnell, 540 U.S. 93, 204-05; Austin v. Mich. 
Chamber of Com., 494 U.S. 652, 661 (1990). 
 111.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 348-49. 
 112.  Id. at 354. 
 113.  Id. at 359. 
 114.  Id. at 360. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. at 361. 
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While the Court did consider advances in technology, such as the 
Internet, it believed that these advances counsel against restricting corporate 
speech, rather than in favor of restricting it.117  This statement runs counter 
to media consumption in the real world, where the expenditure of more 
money leads to the dissemination of a message to more people, and the 
drowning out of other views by monopolizing limited advertising space and 
time.118  By ruling that no government interest justifies prohibiting corporate 
political expenditures, the Court overturned the precedent from McConnell 
and Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.119 
Justice Stevens, joined by three Justices, wrote a scathing and lengthy 
Dissenting Opinion, emphasizing that although the First Amendment 
prohibits distinguishing between speakers when restricting speech, it is 
inaccurate to treat the “identity” of corporations as identical to that of 
natural persons.120  Corporations cannot vote or run for office, and may 
have interests that conflict with eligible voters as they may be controlled 
by nonresidents.121  These facts provide lawmakers with a compelling 
interest, “if not also a democratic duty, to . . . guard against the potentially 
deleterious effects of corporate spending” in federal campaigns.122  
Additionally, corporations have historically been prohibited from 
campaign spending since the passage of the Tillman Act in 1907, a 
precedent so accepted by Buckley that there was no constitutional 
challenge to the corporation restriction.123 
In overturning Austin and McConnell, the Court went against stare 
decisis, and claimed those decisions are “dead wrong in [their] reasoning or 
irreconcilable with the rest of [the Court’s] doctrine.”124  Justice Stevens 
pointed out the contradictions inherent in the Majority’s opinion, such as the 
fact that political parties are prohibited from spending soft money on express 
advocacy advertisements, while corporations are now free to spend as much 
general treasury money on these same adsvertisements as they wish.125  This 
“dramatically enhances the role of corporations and unions—and the narrow 
 
 117.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364. 
 118.  Corporations are able to use their vast resources to purchase far more advertising than 
individual people, and therefore can drown out opposing viewpoints by purchasing more 
advertising time in the lead up to elections. 
 119.  Citizens United, 558 U.S at 366.  
 120.  Id. at 394 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
 121.  Id. 
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 124.  Id. at 409. 
 125.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 412. 
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interests they represent” in the political system, along with the distorting 
effects of the immense amount of money available to those groups.126 
The Majority Opinion of Citizens United rests on three premises: (1) 
Austin and McConnell have banned corporate speech, (2) the First 
Amendment precludes regulatory distinction based on the speaker’s 
“identity” as a corporation, and (3) Austin and McConnell were radical 
outliers in campaign finance doctrine.127  Each of these premises are wrong.  
The statutes do not impose an absolute ban on corporate spending, but rather 
prohibit spending from the general treasury funds, while leaving open the 
option to establish separate, segregated funds in the form of PACs.128  While 
FECA and BCRA single out corporations, the Court previously held that 
speech may be regulated on account of the speaker’s identity when 
understood in institutional terms, such as “students, prisoners, members of 
the Armed Forces, foreigners, and [government] employees,” so long as the 
restrictions are justified by legitimate government interests.129  The Majority 
in Citizens United would appear to “afford the same protection to 
multinational corporations controlled by foreigners as to individual 
Americans.”130  The Majority emphasizes the identity-based distinctions of 
FECA and BCRA “without ever explaining why corporate identity demands 
the same treatment as individual identity” of natural persons.131 
As to the third premise, Justice Stevens asserted that in assessing the 
First Amendment’s tradition, corporations were never intended to be 
permitted the same freedom of speech protections as natural persons.132  
Corporations at the time of the Founding were explicitly authorized by 
legislative charter, and the Framers considered Free Speech Rights of the 
individual when drafting the First Amendment, rather than that of 
corporations.133  Further, the views of the Framers are not altogether useful 
when applying the First Amendment to campaign finance regulations 
because of how radically different today’s political universe is from theirs.134 
The Majority Opinion downplays the Government’s interests in 
anticorruption, anti-distortion, and protecting the views of dissenting 
 
 126.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 412. 
 127.  Id. at 414-15. 
 128.  Id. at 415. 
 129.  Id. at 420 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
 130.  Id. at 424. 
 131.  Id. at 425. 
 132.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 425. 
 133.  Id. at 427-28; see Alina Ball, Contextualizing the Corporate Rights Movement in 
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 134.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 432 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).  
(DO NOT DELETE) 10/7/2019  11:44 AM 
182  HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 47:1 
shareholder in relation to corporate political expenditures.135  The Majority’s 
view that Congress may only regulate explicit quid pro quo arrangements 
ignores the fact that corruption or the appearance of corruption “operates 
along a spectrum,” and selling access in exchange for campaign financing 
can be equally damaging to the political system and the public’s view of 
corruption in Congress.136  The current regime has resulted in members of 
Congress who will only meet with lobbyists who give them money, rather 
than listening to views from all sides on any given issue.137  The Court’s 
narrow reading of the government’s anticorruption interest—that it is limited 
to clear quid pro quo corruption—makes this interest essentially useless in 
regulating, as “proving that a specific vote was exchanged for a specific 
expenditure has always been next to impossible.”138  This interpretation 
ignores the Government’s interest in protecting the public’s faith in its 
representatives and its government in general, for “a democracy cannot 
function effectively when its constituent members believe laws are being 
bought and sold.”139  The Court instead chooses not to show deference to 
Congress, who have first-hand experience with the corrupting effects of 
corporate expenditures, while providing “no clear rationale” for doing so.140 
The Government’s interest in preventing the distorting effects of 
corporate campaign expenditures is compelling as well, because very few 
natural persons have access to the amount of money maintained by a 
corporation.  A corporation’s primary goal is to be as profitable as possible, 
which causes it to “amass and deploy financial resources on a scale few 
natural persons can match.”141  Additionally, corporations must engage in 
the electoral process “to enhance the profitability of the company, no matter 
how persuasive the arguments for a broader or conflicting set of priorities,” 
which leads them to advocate policies beneficial to themselves, but not 
always those beneficial to the country.142  Corporations also “have no 
consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires,” and may be 
controlled by foreigners.143  Finally, due to their deep pocketbooks, 
corporations may “grab up the prime broadcast slots on the eve of an 
 
 135.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 447 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
 136.  Id. at 448. 
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election,” flooding the market with advocacy not correlated to the ideas of 
natural persons, and thereby marginalize the views of real people.144  Due to 
these qualities of corporations, their electioneering creates a distorting effect 
on policies that Congress has a compelling interest in limiting. 
Finally, the shareholders of a corporation foot the bill for the use of 
general treasury funds on political expenditures, which inevitably means that 
some shareholders’ money is “used to undermine their political 
convictions.”145  This problem is eliminated with the statutory exception 
provided for PACs, ensuring that “those who pay for an electioneering 
communication actually support its contents.”146  While this interest on its 
own is not sufficient to justify restrictions on corporate expenditures, it 
reinforces the Government’s anti–distortion interest by adding another 
reason to doubt that corporate political expenditures reflect actual public 
support for the political ideas espoused.147 
These points emphasize why corporate campaign expenditures are more 
likely to impair government interests, and why restrictions on those 
expenditures are less likely to infringe on First Amendment freedoms: It is 
difficult to explain “who” is speaking through the corporation.148  Simply 
put, corporations “are not themselves members of ‘We the People’ by whom 
and for whom our Constitution was established.’”149  Once Citizens United 
lifted restrictions on corporate campaign expenditures, aggregate limits 
remained the only restraint on money flowing into elections, until those too 
were struck down a year later. 
D. McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission (2014) 
The final constitutional challenge to FECA attacked aggregate limits to 
campaign contributions in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission.150  
Aggregate limits restrict the amount of money a donor may contribute in 
total, while base limits restrict the amount of money a donor may contribute 
to a particular candidate.151  Following the same reasoning as in Citizens 
United, the Court struck down aggregate limits to campaign contributions 
because Congress may not regulate “simply to reduce the amount of money 
in politics, or to restrict the political participation of some in order to enhance 
 
 144.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 470 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
 145.  Id. at 475. 
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the relative influence of others.”152  The Court found that aggregate limits 
“do little, if anything” to prevent the circumvention of base limits to 
campaign contributions, and struck down aggregate limits as violative of the 
First Amendment.153 
In striking down aggregate limits, the Court overturned Buckley, which 
found that the Government’s compelling interest in preventing corruption or 
the appearance of corruption was sufficient to justify the restrictions on 
aggregate contributions in a political cycle.154  The Court held that Buckley 
“does not control here” with regard to the constitutionality of aggregate 
limits because Buckley “spent a total of three sentences analyzing that limit,” 
and “safeguards against circumvention have been considerably 
strengthened” since that decision.155  The Court also relied on the fact that 
the First Amendment “safeguards an individual’s right to participate in the 
public debate through political expression,” though Buckley distinguished 
campaign contributions from campaign expenditures under the notion that 
contributions were more of an exercise of the right to associate, while 
expenditures exercised the right to express political beliefs.156 
McCutcheon finds that aggregate limits “prohibit an individual from 
fully contributing to the primary and general election campaigns of ten or 
more candidates,” and thereby impermissibly infringes on First Amendment 
protections.157  While the Buckley Court characterized the aggregate limit as 
“quite a modest restraint upon protected political activity,” the McCutcheon 
Court disagreed, stating that a limit on the number of candidates to whom a 
donor may contribute money “is not a ‘modest restraint’ at all.”158  The Court 
characterizes the Government’s interest in preventing corruption or its 
appearance as legitimate, seemingly downgraded from its characterization as 
compelling in Buckley.159  But as in Citizens United, the Court takes the 
narrow view that the government may only target actual quid pro quo 
arrangements of contributions for votes.160 
The Court finds that “spending money in connection with elections, but 
not in connection with an effort to control the exercise of an office holder’s 
official duties” does not give rise to the quid pro quo corruption that 
 
 152.  McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 191. 
 153.  Id. at 193. 
 154.  Id. at 200. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id.at 203. 
 157.  Id. at 204.  
 158.  McCutcheon, 572 U.S at 204 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 38). 
 159.  McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 207. 
 160.  Id. 
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Congress may regulate.161  This scope of regulatory power is functionally 
impractical in the real world because any quid pro quo agreement is nearly 
impossible to prove, and the sale of access for campaign donations can be 
just as corrupting and cause just as much disillusionment in voters as actual 
votes for contribution agreements.  The Court focuses on the fact that 
FECA’s aggregate limit would permit donating the base limit of $5,200 to 
nine candidates, but not ten.162  While this argument makes the limits seem 
arbitrary, it ignores the fact that having no limit at all makes it impossible to 
advance, as the Majority concedes, the Government’s “legitimate interest” 
in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.163  Simply put, the 
line must be drawn somewhere, and the Majority attacks the hard limit based 
on the fact that it is a hard limit, without showing alternatives that would 
effectively replace those aggregate limits.164 
In his Dissent, Justice Breyer explains that while the expansive record 
compiled in McConnell did not turn up a single instance of quid pro quo 
corruption, it did reveal that enormous soft money contributions provided 
disproportionate access to lawmakers and the ability to influence 
legislation.165  This form of corruption is exactly the type that the Majority’s 
narrow definition of corruption or its appearance excludes, and is the type 
that Congress sought to prevent through FECA and BCRA.  Aggregate limits 
serve to prevent corruption because there is “an indisputable link between 
generous political donations and opportunity after opportunity to make one’s 
case directly to a Member of Congress.”166  The ruling in McCutcheon 
substitutes Judges’ understandings of how the political process works for the 
understanding of Congress, overturns key precedent, and creates expansive 
loopholes in the law that “undermines, perhaps devastates, what remains of 
campaign finance reform.”167 
III.  Money as Speech in Current Congressional Elections 
At this point, base contribution limits are the only campaign finance 
restrictions that have survived constitutional attack, which has led to an 
exponential increase in the amount of money spent on each national election.  
The disillusionment of voters that the Supreme Court dismissed as 
improbable has led to a rise in the popularity of candidates who refuse to 
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take corporate PAC money, because voters believe those candidates will 
represent them rather than the corporations who contributed to their 
campaigns.168  One recent example is Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-
Cortez, who defeated ten-term Congressman Joe Crowley in the 2018 
midterm primary election despite being outraised by a 10-to-1 margin.169  
Ocasio-Cortez won without taking any “corporate lobbyist money,” with 
over 89,000 donations that averaged only $20.86 per donation.170  This 
message that “it’s not OK to put donors before your community” has 
resonated with voters due to the increasing feeling that members of Congress 
represent their donors rather than their constituents.171 
This is not a baseless sentiment, as financial records have shown that 
86% of contributions for some congressmen come from businesses.172  
When such a large percentage of the funds necessary to win reelection 
comes from corporations, it affects the votes of representatives in 
Congress.  Those representatives are told by donors to pass bills beneficial 
to those donors “or don’t ever call me again.”173  As a result, those 
representatives vote in favor of bills even if they would negatively affect a 
large number their constituents, because of the need to please their donor 
class—“i.e., corporate and wealthy America”—and to be able to raise the 
large sums of money required to win re–election.174  Representatives vote 
how their donors want them to vote, rather than how their constitutents 
want them to vote, because they need the “speech” in the form of 
independent expenditures protected by the First Amendment to win 
reelection.  While not the explicit quid pro quo corruption agreements that 
the Supreme Court defined as within the government’s power to regulate, 
this form of corruption or at least the appearance of corruption is the reason 
that Congress passed FECA and BCRA.175 
 
 168.  Lee Drutman, The Case for Cautious Optimism on Campaign Finance Reform, VOX 
(Aug. 21, 2018, 1:50 PM), https://www.vox.com/polyarchy/2018/8/21/17764362/campaign-finan 
ce-reform-optimism. 
 169.  Gregory Krieg, A 28-Year-Old Democrat Socialist Just Ousted a Powerful, 10-Term 
Congressman in New York, CNN (June 27, 2018, 2:34 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/26/pol 
itics/alexandria-ocasio-cortez-joe-crowley-new-york-14-primary/index.html. 
 170.  Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (@Ocasio2018), TWITTER (Oct. 18, 2018, 1:41 PM), https://tw 
itter.com/ocasio2018/status/1053023260068200448. 
 171.  Krieg, supra note 169. 
 172.  Leonhardt, supra note 137. 
 173.  Dylan Scott, House Republican: My Donors Told Me to Pass the Tax Bill “or Don’t Ever 
Call Me Again”, VOX (Nov. 7, 2017, 11:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017 
/11/7/16618038/house-republicans-tax-bill-donors-chris-collins. 
 174.  Id.  
 175.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27. 
(DO NOT DELETE) 10/7/2019  11:44 AM 
FALL 2019] CORPORATE CONSTITUENTS 187 
The skyrocketing amount of money required to win a congressional 
election has allowed donors to exercise more undue influence on members 
of Congress.  Due to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Citizens United and 
McCutcheon, nearly unlimited spending in elections means that members of 
Congress must spend much of their time “dialing for dollars.”176  The average 
cost of winning a Senate seat in 2016 was $10.4 million, while a House seat 
cost the winner $1.4 million.177  This means that Senators must raise $4,748 
per day from the day they are sworn in, while members of the House must 
raise $1,917 per day in order to win reelection.  These numbers are only 
higher in competitive states and districts, and as a result, newly elected 
members of Congress must spend at last thirty hours per week calling donors 
to raise money, which takes time away from legislating for the good of their 
constituents, which they were elected to do.178  Citizens United is a direct 
cause of this, as the hours spent fundraising per day jumped from an hour 
and a half to three or four hours following the decision.179 
Due to the enormous price tag associated with congressional 
campaigns, it is no wonder that so many candidates accept the large 
paychecks offered by corporations, rather than spending more time on the 
phone soliciting donations.  While many democratic candidates (at least 170 
candidates in the 2018 midterm election) have refused to take corporate PAC 
money, they are fighting an uphill battle against those who do take corporate 
PAC money in exchange for access to those candidates once they are elected 
for lobbying purposes.180  Until the exorbitant amount of money spent on 
campaigns is controlled, voters will continue to believe the system is corrupt, 
and that their “vote does not matter because of the influence that wealthy 
individuals and corporations have on the electoral process.”181  A November 
2015 poll showed that 93% of Democrats and 88% of Republicans said the 
government “tended ‘very’ or ‘somewhat well’ to the interests of the 
wealthy,” while 90% of Democrats and 86% of Republicans said the 
government did the same for big corporations.182 
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IV.  Fixing the Problem:  
How to Return Power to Real, Living Constituents 
A. United States Supreme Court: Constitutional Limits and 
Disclosure Requirements 
Perhaps the most important arena where a change in sentiment 
towards campaign finance should occur is in the jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court of the United States.  Freedom of speech, at least in the area 
of political contributions and expenditures, must be reclaimed for natural 
persons alone, and not for corporate entities.  Without changing the 
permissibility of certain campaign financing regulations, any legitimate 
attempts at reform will be struck down on constitutional grounds.  The 
combination of Citizens United and McCutcheon appears to leave few 
avenues of acceptable campaign finance reform for the current Supreme 
Court.  The most likely avenue for comprehensive campaign finance 
reform would be a return in thinking by the Court to that of Buckley, Austin 
v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, and McConnell.183 
In Austin, the Court followed the reasoning of Buckley and held that 
it was constitutional to ban corporations from making independent 
campaign expenditures.184  The Austin Court upheld the restriction on 
corporate campaign expenditures based on the same government interests 
of anticorruption, anti-distortion, and shareholder protection, which the 
court later found were not sufficiently compelling or narrowly tailored in 
Citizens United.185 
The Supreme Court has ruled favorably on some issues relating to 
campaign finance regulations, such as ordering disclosure for donations to 
“dark money” political nonprofit groups, which previously were not 
required to disclose the identity of donors.186  These dark money nonprofits 
are organized as Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(4) social welfare 
or 501(c)(6) business associations, and previously did not have to disclose 
their donors as long as less than 50% of their donations went to political 
contributions or expenditures.187  However, the Court has consistently 
upheld disclosure laws relating to campaign financing, only striking down 
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restrictions on contributions and expenditures due to their First 
Amendment implications.188 
There seems to be little hope for a return to the thinking of Buckley, 
Austin, and McConnell in the near future as the two newest Supreme Court 
Justices, Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh, both support the rationale 
of Citizens United and McCutcheon.189  Justice Gorsuch wrote a Concurring 
Opinion in Riddle v. Hickenlooper, arguing that contributing to political 
campaigns implicates the basic constitutional freedoms to speak and 
associate, and should not be infringed upon.190  In a memo written in 2002, 
Justice Kavanaugh argued that the way to fix the campaign finance system 
is “to eliminate contribution limits,” rather than regulating the overall 
amount of money spent independently.191  While he believes contribution 
limits should be struck down, Justice Kavanaugh upheld a prohibition on 
foreign participation in United States elections because “foreign citizens do 
not have a constitutional right to participate in” United States elections.192  
Therefore, it appears unlikely that Citizens United will be overturned by the 
current Supreme Court, at least until one of the remaining members of the 
Citizens United Majority is replaced, and thus, advocates for campaign 
finance reform must look elsewhere in search of means for reform. 
B. Congressional Legislation 
Another avenue for campaign finance reform is through congressional 
legislation that attempts to comply with the rulings of the Supreme Court.  
Democratic Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi stated 
before the 2018 midterm elections that a Democratic House would push for 
changes to campaign finance laws.193  To follow through on this statement, 
House Democrats unveiled the first bill they planned to pass when seated on 
January 3, 2019, which includes provisions requiring “all political 
organizations to disclose donors and an overhaul of the Federal Election 
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Commission.194  As promised, the House of Representatives introduced the 
“For the People Act” on January 3, 2019, and passed the bill on March 8, 
2019.195  While this bill likely will not even receive a vote in the Sennate, it 
shows that Democrats are focused on addressing the issue, and may include 
parts of the bill “as policy riders in government spending bills or other large 
pieces of legislation.”196 
Because the Supreme Court has made clear that restrictions on 
contributions and expenditures are unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment, Democrats are promising to pass a “small-donor campaign 
finance matching system” to help bolster the power of less wealthy 
individuals.197  This system would match small-dollar contributions six-to-
one with public money in order to incentivize members of Congress to seek 
funds from their constituents rather than corporations.198  Some caution is 
warranted in believing these bills will fix the campaign finance system, as 
campaign finance reform is “easy to promise and hard to deliver.”199 
Opponents of a public financing system argue they should not be forced 
to pay for the campaigns of politicians they do not support.200  However, this 
argument rings hollow—the Court found this argument unconvincing when 
it was made in favor of the Government’s interest in protecting dissenting 
shareholders in Citizens United.201  The idea behind the bill is to “fight and 
end the dominance of big money in politics,” and to promote the issue on the 
national stage, even if it will be rejected by Senate Majority Leader Mitch 
McConnell, who has long been outspoken against efforts of campaign 
finance reform.202  Any congressional legislation would have to survive 
constitutional challenges however, which will likely entail an uphill battle 
with the current Supreme Court. 
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C. Constitutional Amendment 
The most difficult method of enacting campaign finance reform, but 
also the only way that does not require a change in opinion by the Supreme 
Court, is to pass a constitutional amendment reversing Citizens United and 
McCutcheon.  A constitutional amendment must receive votes by “two thirds 
of both houses,” and must be “ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of 
the several states.”203  Alternatively, a constitutional convention may be 
called for by two-thirds of the state legislatures, and any amendment that is 
ratified by three-fourths of the state legislatures is passed.204  However, no 
constitutional amendment has been passed since 1992, when the 27th 
Amendment, requiring any pay changes for Congress to take effect after the 
next election, was ratified.205 
This sounds like an insurmountable challenge in today’s hyper-
polarized political world, but recent studies have shown that three-fourths 
of survey respondents, including 66% of Republicans and 85% of 
Democrats, support a constitutional amendment reversing Citizens 
United.206  The same study shows that 88% of Americans “want to reduce 
the influence large campaign donors wield over lawmakers at a time when 
a single congressional election may cost tens of millions of dollars.”207  
Additionally, 60% of survey respondents viewed the reduction of influence 
of big campaign donors as “very important.”208  Less than half of those 
surveyed considered an anti-Citizens United amendment to be an attack on 
Free Speech Rights and more than four out of five agreed with the 
statement that “the rich should not have more influence just because they 
have more money.”209 
This public support did not appear following the decision of Citizens 
United in 2010—since at least 2001, more than three-fourths of Americans 
continue to believe there should be tighter limits on political campaign 
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contributions.210  This vast public support for the “most drastic step that can 
be taken” reflects public frustration that elected representatives are 
influenced by major donors rather than by the needs of their constituents.211 
There have been several amendments proposed, but the “We The 
People Amendment” is the one that has garnered the most support, with 
sixty-five cosponsors in the House of Representatives.212  This amendment 
would reserve the rights protected by the Constitution for “natural persons 
only,” and enable federal, state, and local governments to regulate political 
contributions and expenditures in order to ensure all citizens have access to 
the political process while preventing any person from gaining substantially 
more influence than others due to their wealth.213  Critics of these types of 
proposed amendments argue they are not sufficiently focused on campaign 
finance because they would strip corporations off all constitutional 
protections, rather than just First Amendment speech protections.214  These 
criticisms are justified as any constitutional amendment must be careful not 
to go too far and risk protecting outright regulation of any political speech.215  
The overwhelming majority of the public supports campaign finance reform, 
however, which makes a constitutional amendment much more likely than it 
would appear at first glance. 
Conclusion 
Congress recognized the corrupting effects of money in politics early 
on and passed regulations in an attempt to stem the influence of big donors 
on politicians with the Tillman Act of 1907, FECA, and BCRA.  These 
regulations were effective, but the Supreme Court’s decisions in Citizens 
United and McCutcheon, overturning Buckley, Austin, and McConnell, have 
led to a flood of money into political campaigns, and disillusionment among 
voters about their actual influence on government and their political 
representatives.  Large corporate donations buy access to legislators while 
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the Supreme Court has ruled that Congress may only target explicit quid pro 
quo arrangements of contributions or expenditures in exchange for votes.  
The current campaign finance system results in members of Congress 
spending multiple hours a day fundraising rather than legislating, and in 
voters clamoring politicians to “drain the swamp” and fight corruption.216 
Barring a change in the ideological makeup of the Supreme Court, a 
ruling overturning Citizens United and returning to the rationale of Buckley 
and McConnell, permitting regulating to prevent corruption or the 
appearance of corruption, seems unlikely.  Democratic members of the 
House of Representatives have promised to pass campaign finance reform 
by bolstering the influence of smaller contributions, but these bills are 
unlikely to become law unless Democrats take control of the Senate and 
Presidency at the same time in the future.  These potential laws would also 
be subject to constitutional challenge, and whether they would survive that 
challenge remains to be seen. 
A constitutional amendment to overturn Citizens United and give 
political influence back to natural persons would go a long way to solve 
problems with campaign financing and voter disillusionment.  Additionally, 
an amendment would return voting power to the people because candidates 
could no longer win elections simply by relying on large expenditures from 
corporations.  The high bar required to pass such an amendment would be 
difficult to reach in today’s hyper-polarized climate however, despite 
support by more than three-fourths of Americans.  Ultimately, 
accomplishing effective campaign finance reform will require immense 
effort and political capital on the part of elected representatives, but is 
absolutely worth the fight to protect the foundational idea of our democracy: 
that the government is established by the People and for the People. 
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